Eben Blomquist v. J. Dal Peterson And Karl D. Blomquist, And Minerals Recovery Company, Aka Mineral Recovery Corporation, A Utah Corporation : Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)
1978
Eben Blomquist v. J. Dal Peterson And Karl D.
Blomquist, And Minerals Recovery Company, Aka
Mineral Recovery Corporation, A Utah
Corporation : Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.Lorin N. Pace; Attorney for Plaintiff-AppellantJOHN W.
HORSLEY and REID E. LEWIS; Attorneys for Defendant-Respondent
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Blomquist v. Peterson, No. 15496 (Utah Supreme Court, 1978).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/921
IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
EBEN BLOMQUIST, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, Case No. 
ITS. 15496 
J. DAL PETERSON and KARL D. 
BLOMQUIST, and MINERALS 
RECOVERY COMPANY, aka MINERAL 
RECOVERY CORPORATION, a Utah 
corporation, 
Defendant-Respondent, 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT 
APPEAL FROM THE JUDGMENT OF THE THIRD 
JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE 
COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
HONORABLE DAVID B. DEE, JUDGE 
LORIN N. PACE 
RANDALL BUNNELL 
431 South Third East, B-1 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
. -:--. 
Attorneys for .. : •· .. 
P la inti ff-Appel~~ 
JOHN W. HORSLEY and 
REID E. LEWIS 
MOYLE & DRAPER 
600 Deseret Plaza 
No. 15, East First South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Defendant-Respondent 
;Jo' 
........, ______ . ____ _ 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
EBEN BLOMQUIST, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
J. DAL PETERSON and KARL D. 
BLOMQUIST, and MINERALS 
RECOVERY COMPANY, aka MINERAL 
RECOVERY CORPORATION, a Utah 
corporation, 
Defendant-Respondent, 
Case No. 
15496 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT 
APPEAL FROM THE JUDGMENT OF THE THIRD 
JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE 
COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
HONORABLE DAVID B. DEE, JUDGE 
JOHN W. HORSLEY and 
REID E. LEWIS 
MOYLE & DRAPER 
600 Deseret Plaza 
No. 15, East First South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
LORIN N. PACE 
RANDALL BUNNELL 
431 South Third East, B-1 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for 
Plaintiff-Appellant 
Attorneys for Defendant-Respondent 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE........................ 1 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL .. .......................... 3 
STATEMENT OF FACTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • • . . . • . . . . 4 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. UNDER ARTICLE 9 OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL 
CODE, A WRITING SIGNED BY THE DEBTOR IS REQUIRED 
BEFORE A SECURITY INTEREST CAN BE CREATED IN 
6 
FAVOR OF THE SECURED PARTY....................... 6 
POINT II. THE FINANCING STATEMENT AND THE PROM-
ISSORY NOTE OF THE INSTANT CASE CONSTITUTE A 
VALID SECURITY AGREEMENT WITHIN THE MEANING OF 
UCA § 70A-9-203 ( 1) (b) • . . • . . . • . . . . • . . . . . . . • . • . . . • . 7 
POINT III. THE RULE OF LAW THAT MULTIPLE DOCUMENTS 
C.Ai.~ SERVE AS A VA LID SECURITY AGREEMENT IS IN 
HARMONY WITH THE UNDERLYING PURPOSES AND POLICIES 
OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE................... 15 
CONCLUSION ........................................... 16 
AUTHORITIES CITED 
STATUTES CITED 
UCA Title 70A-9-203 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . • . . • . 2, 3, 16 
UCA Title 70A-9-203(1) (b) .........•..........••.... 6,7,8,10, 
15,16 
UCA Title 70A-9-l10 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6, 11 
UCA Title 70A-9-105(h) ....................... · · · · · · 6,8,11 
UCA Title 70A-l-102 ( 1) ......... ·. · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 6 
UCA Title 70A-9-102 (2) ..........•.... · · ... · · · · · · · · · 13,16 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS-CONTINUED 
Page 
CASES CITED 
Amex-Protein Development Corp., 504 F2d 1056 
(9th Cir. 1974)................................. 7,13 
Barney, In re, 344 F.Supp 694 (DC Ida., 1972) ........ 9 
Center Auto Parts, In re, 6 ucc Rep 398 (CD Calif. 
1968) I•••••••••••••••••••• • • • • • • • •. • • • •. • • • • • • •. 10, 12, 14 
Clark v. Vaughn, 504 S.W. 2d 550 (Tex. Civ. App., 
1973)........................................... 7,9,10 
Evans v. Everett, 279 NC 352, 183 SE 2d 109 (1971) ... 9,13 
Fibre Glass Boat Corp., In re, 324 F.Supp 1054 
(DCSD Fla., 1971), aff'd w/o opinion 448 F2d 781 
(5th Cir., 1971) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 
Harmon, In Re, 6 UCC Rep 1280 (DCD Conn., Ref., 1969) 13 
Martronics Inc., In re, 2 UCC Rep 364 (D Conn., Ref., 
aff'd by Dist. Ct. 1964) .......•................ 7 
Nottingham, In re, 6 UCC Rep 1197 (DCED Tenn., Ref., 
1969)........................................... 9,13,14 
Numeric Corp., In re, 485 F2d 1328 (1st Cir. 1973) ... 7,13,15 
Penn Housing Corp., In re, 367 F.Supp 661 (WD Pa. 
1973) ..............•............................ 7,12 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF' THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
EBEN BLOMQUIST! 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
VS. 
J. DAL PETERSON and KARL D. 
BLOMQUIST, and MINERALS 
RECOVERY COMPANY, aka MINERAL 
RECOVERY CORPORATION, a Utah 
corporation, 
Defendant-Respondent, 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE 
By his amended complaint, filed October 15, 1976 
(R. 15-18), Plaintiff seeks to recover the sum of $10,222.00 
with interest and attorney's fees on a note (R. 75) executed 
by Defendants J. Dal Peterson and Karl W. Blomquist in favor 
of plaintiff. Plaintiff seeks an adjudication by the Court 
that the promissory note is secured by a certain piece of 
mining equipment known as a "belt tank". Title to the belt 
tank was assigned to Defendant. Minerals Recovery Corporation 
by Defendant Peterson. 
By the terms of the promissory note, Defendants Peterson 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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and Blomquist were jointly and severally liable. On 
February 9, 1977, a default judgment on the promissory 
note was entered against Defendant Peterson with interest 
and attorney's fees (R. 41). On October 13, 1976, Plaintiff 
and Defendant Blomquist stipulated that the belt tank could 
be sold pursuant to the established procedures of the District 
Court, and that the proceeds from the sale could be use to pay , 
the promissory note plus interest and cost of the action 
(R. 69-70). 
In Defendant Mineral Recovery Corporation's answer to the 
plaintiff's canplaint (R. 20-23) filed November 8, 1976, Min-
eral Recovery Corporation denied that the promissory note had 
been secured by the belt tank. Specifically, Mineral Recovery 
alleged that there existed no security interest in the belt 
tank in favor of the Plaintiff because the Plaintiff and the 
Defendants Peterson and Blomquist had not executed a security 
agreement, pursuant to UCA § 70A-9-203. 
On June 7, 1977, Plaintiff moved the District Court for 
summary judgment (R. 67) based upon the following documents: 
1. Default judg?r.ent against Defendant Peterson (R. 41) 
2. Stipulation of Defendant Blomquist and the Plaintiff 
(R. 69-70) 
3. The affidavit of the Plaintiff (R. 71-75) 
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4. The affidavit of Defendant Blomquist 
5. The affidavit of Sidney Horman (R. 76-77) 
On July 11, 1977, Defendant Mineral Recovery Corporation also 
moved for summary judgment (R. 86-87). 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The motions for summary judgment were heard before the 
District Court, Honorable David B. Dee presiding, on July 14, 
1977. At the ~aring, the Court considered the question of 
whether there existed a valid security agreement between the 
Plaintiff and the Defendants Peterson and Blomquist. The 
court denied the Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and 
entered judgme.nt in favor of the Defendant Minerals Recovery 
Corporation (R. 112-113). The District Court, in its memor-
andum decision, held that UCA ~ 70A-9-203 " ... does not allow 
the creation of a security agreement under the facts in this 
case taking the promissory note and financing statement to-
gether and reading them in a light mcst favorable to the 
plaintiff ... " (R.124). 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff seeks the following relief on appeal: 
1. A determination that a valid security agreement 
pursuant to UCA s 70A-9-203 was entered into by the Plaintiff 
and the Defendants Peterson and Blomquist, securing the 
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promissory note by the belt tank. 
2. A determination that the Plaintiff is entitled to 
an order by the District Court providing for the sale of 
the belt tank in accordance with the rules and practices 
of the District Court, to satisfy the Plaintiff's judgment 
on the note. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. On June 11, 1974, Defendants J. Dal Peterson and 
Karl W. Blomquist executed a promissory note (R. 75) for 
$10,222.00 in favor of Plaintiff, Eben J. Blomquist. The 
note was due and payble in one installment on September 1, 
1974. At the bottom of the note the following notion appears: 
"This note is secured by a Security Agreement of even date." 
2. At the time the promissory note was executed, a 
financing statement (R.74) was signed by Defendants Blomquist 
and Peterson (R. 71-72). It was understood at this time that 
these two Defendants were to give a certain belt tank as 
security for the promissory note (R. 71-72). The financing 
statement was filed August 7, 1974 in the office of the Sec-
retary of State (R. 73-74). The financing statement (R. 74) 
contains the following information: 
A. The names of the Defendants Carl W. Blomquist and 
J. Dal Peterson and the address of J. Dal Peterson. 
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B. The name of the Plaintiff, including the Plaintiff's 
address. 
C. A detailed description of the belt tank: "Mining 
Equipment - specifically 1-90' Belt Tank including electric 
motors, hoppers, Belt, and other attached equipment now 
located at Notum, Utah". 
D. Signatures of Defendants, Carl W. Blomquist and J. Dal 
Peterson. 
E. Signature of the Plaintiff, Eben J. B1omquist. 
F. The date of the filing of the financing statement. 
G. "maturity date" specified as September 1, 1974, 
referring to the maturity date of pranissory note. 
3. At the time the promissory note was signed by the 
Defendants, Defendant Peterson had title to and was in rightful 
possession of the belt tank (R. 76-77; 72). Also, at the time 
the financing statement was filed, Defendant Peterson still 
had title to and was in possession of the belt tank. Sub-
sequent to thefiling of the financing statement, Defendant 
Peterson assigned the belt tank to Mineral Recovery Corporation 
(R. 65). 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
UNDER ARTICLE 9 OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, 
A WRITING SIGNED BY THE DEBTOR IS REQUIRED 
BEFORE A SECURITY INTEREST CAN BE CREATED IN 
FAVOR OF THE SECURED PARTY 
UCA § 70A-9-203(1) (b) provides that " ... a security interest 
is not enforceable against the debtor or third parties unless 
the debtor has signed a security agreement which contains a 
<:Escri.ption of the collateral." The description " ... is sufficient 
whether or not it is specific if it reasonably identifies what 
is described." UCA § 70A-9-110. "Security Agreement" is defined 
as " ... an agreement which creates or provides for a security 
interest ... " UCA § 70A-9-105 (h) . The foregoing language from 
Article 9 is the only language that can be found in the Uniform 
Commercial Code in reference to determining the question of 
whether a valid security agreement exists between the debtor and 
the secured party. Obviously, because of the lack of statutory 
definition and language, the que3tion of what constitutes a 
valid "security agreement" is open to a wide range of judicial 
. I 
interpreta ticn. The question before the instant court is whet~er 
the financinq statement (R. 74) and promissory note (R.75) 
constitute a valid security aqreement under UCA § 70A-9-203 ( l', lb 
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POINT II. 
THE FINANCING STATEMENT AND THE PROMISSORY 
NOTE OF THE INSTANT CASE CONSTITUTE A VALID 
SECURITY AGREEMENT WITHIN THE MEANING OF 
UCA § 70A-9-203 ( 1) (b) 
The established rule in American Jurisprudence in regard 
to the "security agreement" requirement of§ 9-203(l)(b) is 
that the "security agreement" need not be confined to only one 
document formally designated as "Security Agreement". Multiple 
documents _can serve to establish the prerequisites of § 9-203 
(1) (b). In re Arnex-Protein Development Corp., .504 F2d 1056 
(9th Cir. 1974) (promissory note, invoices, and financing 
statement were evidence of a valid security agreement); In re 
Numeric:: Corporation,. 485 F2d 1328 (1st Cir. 1973); In re Penn 
Housing Corp., 367 F.Supp 661 (WD pa. 1973) (financing statement 
promissory notes and letters constituted valid security agree-
ments); In re Martronics, 2 UCC Rep 364 (D Conn., Ref., aff'd 
by Dist. Ct. 1964) (loan agreement, promissory note and financing 
statement constituted security agreement); In re Fibre. Glass Boat 
Corp., 324 F. Supp 1054 (DCSD Fla., 1971), aff'd w/o opinion 
448 F2d 781 (5th Cir., 1971) (letter arrl financing statement 
constituted valid security agreement) ; Clark v. Vaughn, 504 SW 
2d 550 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973 (motor vehicle title certificate 
constituted valid security agreement): In In re Numeric Corp., 
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supra at 1331, the court gave the foll::iwing rationale for the 
above rule: 
.•. we have little difficulty concluding 
that a separate formal document entitled 
"Security Agreement" is not always nec-
essary to satisfy a signed-writing req-
uirement of § 9-203(1) (bl. The drafts-
men of the UCC ascribed two purposes to 
that requirement. One purpose was evid-
entiary, to prevent disputes as to precisely 
which items of property are covered by a 
security interest. (citations omitted) The 
second purpose of the signed-writing req-
uirement is to serve as a Statute of Frauds, 
preventing the enforcement of claims based 
on wholly oral representations. (citation 
omitted) . 
Given these two limited purposes of 
§ 9-203(1) (b) and the flexible definitions 
of "security agreement" found elsewhere in 
the Code, there seems to be no need to in-
sist upon a separate document entitled 
"security agreement" as a prerequisite 
for enforcement for an otherwise valid 
security interest. A writing or writings, 
regardless of lable, which adequately 
describes the collateral, carries the sig-
nature of the debtor, and establishes that 
in fact a security interest was agreed upon 
would satisfy both the formal requirements 
of the statute and the policies behind it. 
(citations omitted) 
In defining the phrase " ... an agreement which creates or 
provides for a security interest ... ," Courts have gene-i:ally 
agreed that formal or technical granting language is not req-
uired to create a valid security agreement within the meaning 
of this statutory language (UCA § 70A-9-105(h). Generally, 
courts have held that a security interest will be deemed to 
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have been created if the court can ascertain from the four 
corners of the various documents the requisite intent on the 
part of the parties to create such a security interest. In re 
Nottingham, 6 UCC Rep 1197 (DCED Tenn., Ref., 1969); ~ 
v. Everett, 279 NC 352, 183 SE 2d 109 (1971); In re Barney, 
344 F.Supp 694 (DC Ida., 1972); Clark v. Vaughn, supra. The 
Court in Nottingham, supra at 1199 stated this rule in the 
following lan0uage: 
There are no magic words that create a 
security interest. There must be language, 
however, in the instrument which when read 
and const:i::ued leads to the logical conclusion 
that it was the intention of the parties 
that a security interest be created ... The 
requirements of the code for creating a 
security interest are aimple ~ ad intention 
to create a security interest is all that 
need be shown - a dozen words or less are 
sufficient ... 
As the Court stated in Barney, supra at 697: 
"Clearly, a security interest can be created 
or cane into existance without using the 
magic words "security interest." 
In Clark v. Vaughn, supra, the court found that an automobile 
title certificate constituted a valid security agreement. The 
court in reaching this conclusion held that specific granting 
language was not required to create a valid security interest: 
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The record does not include a written 
agreement signed by Clark stating spec-
ifically that Vaughn shall have a lien 
on or security interest in the automobil~. 
but it does contain the title certificate,. 
which as the trial court found, was signed 
by Clark and delivered to Vaughn. It con-
tained a description of the collateral, and 
was undoubtedly intended by both parties to 
be written evidence of Vaughn's interest in 
the vehicle, and, while the question is not 
free from doubt, we hold that it was sufficient 
to constitute a signed security agreement with-
in the meaning of section 9-203. (Clark v. 
Vaughn, supra at 553) 
It is apparent from the foregoing case law that specific, 
technical granting language is not a prerequisite to the creation' 
I 
of a security interest and that a court in ascertaining whether 
or not a valid security agreement exists, can rely upon lang-
uage within the various related documents evidencing an intent 
on the part of the parties to create a security interest. 
There is one case on point. In In re Center Auto Parts, 
6 UCC Rep 398 (CD Calif. 1968), the debtor made a promissory 
note which stated: "This note is secured by a certain financing I 
statement." The debtor and the secured party also signed a I 
financing statement and filed it. The court found that the I 
promissory note "created and provided for a security interest"'. if 
pursuant to 9-203 (i) (b). The court also found that the financi"' 
statement adequately identified the ro llateral based on the tes'. I 
1 
I 
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of 5 70A-9-ll0. The court also took note of the fact that the 
financing statement was the only one on file between the parties. 
Thus, it was held that the promissory note and the financing 
statement together constituted a valid security agreement. 
The following is the analysis used by the court in reaching its 
decision: 
Section 9203 of the Commercial Code provides 
in pertinent part that a security interest is 
not enforceable against the debtor or third 
parties unless the debtor has signed a sec-
urity agreement which contains a description 
of the collateral. Thus, the following three 
questions must be answered in the affirmative 
in order to allow respondent to stand as a 
secured creditor: 
(1) Has the Agreement Been Signed by the Debtor? 
Clearly both the note and the Financing State-
ment have been signed by the debtor. 
(2) Is it a "Security Agreement"? 
A "security agreement" is defined in Section 
9-105 ( 1) (h) of the Commercial Code as an "agree-
ment which creates or provides for a security 
interest." As did:the court in the case of 
American Card Company v. H.M.H. CO., 196 A2d 150 
(1 UCC Rep 447) (RI 1963), this court concludes 
that the Financing Statement, though it is 
signed by the debtors and contains a description 
of the property, does not standing alone allow a 
priority for a valid security interest since the 
financing statement filed in the office of the 
Secretary of State did not contain the debtor's 
grant of security interest. However, the note 
does in fact "create and provide for a security 
interest." Its language is clear that a sec-
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urity interest was to be granted by the 
execution of the note for it states, 
"This note is secured by a certain 
financing statement." It has been stip-
ulated that the financing statement in 
evidence is the only one between the 
parties. Thus, by looking to the financ-
ing statement, the property provided by 
the debtors as security for the loan 
made by respondent is identified. 
(3) Does it Contain a Description of the Colj_ateral? 
Section 9-110 of the Commercial Code state.s, 
"Sufficiency of Description. For purposes of 
this division (this Article) any description 
of personal property or real estate is sufficient 
whether or not it is specific if it reasonably I 
identifies what is described." The note describes 
the collateral by reference to the Financing 1 
Statement. The Financing Statement lists as the I 
collateral the inventory of auto parts and office r 
furnishings. The address of the chief place of 
business of Center Auto Parts is provided in the 
Financing Statement. "It is not essential that 
the descr+ption be so specific that the property 
may be identified by it alone, if such description/ 
suggests inquiries or means of identification 
which, if pursued, will disclose the property cov-1 
ered. This rule is based upon "the maxim, that is I 
certain which is capable of being made certain." 
(Citation omitted) (In re Center Auto Parts, ~ 
at 399-4ooJ I 
It should be noted that the opinion in In re Center Auto I 
I Parts has been reviewed by many jurisdictions and has become a 
respected precedent in American Jurisprudence for defining the 
UCC Article 9 provision dealing with "security agreement." 
The following jurisdictions expressly approve of or at least 
favorably cite the opinion: In Re Penn Housing Corp .• supra; 
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In re Amex-Protein, supra; In re Harmon, 6 UCC Rep 1280 
(DCD Conn., Ref., 1969); In re Numeric, supra; In re 
Nottingham, supra; Evans v. Everett, supra. 
Generally, the mere fact that a majority of juris-
dictions follow a certain precedent is not persuasive 
with a court of law. A court of law is more concerned with 
the underlying rationale and soundness of the rule. Ho\<\Sver, 
in the case of UCC statutory interpretation, the mere fact 
of precedent is a factor properly to be weighed by the Court. 
UCA § 70A-102(2) provides that an underlying purpose and 
policy of the UCC is " ... to make uniform the law among the 
various jurisdictions." 
It should be apparent that the instant promissory note 
and financing statement together constitute a valid security 
agreement under the foregoing case law. The promissory note 
clearly specifies the terms of the agreement, the debtors" 
signatures appear on the note, and the note states: "This note 
is secured by a Security Agreement of even date." The financing 
statement on file between the parties clearly identifies the 
collateral, all parties involved signed the statement, and the 
"maturity date" specified on the financing statement is the 
identical date specified on the note as the date the note is due. 
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Obviously, the language, "This note is secured by a 
certain Security Agreement of even date", in conjunction 
with the other items of information contained in the two 
documents, clearly "creates or provides for a security 
interest". Based upon the· test of Nottingham, supra, it is 
apparent that when these two documents are read and construed 
together, it must be logically concluded that the parties 
intended a security interest. According to the Nottingham 
test, the intent of the parties is all that need be shown. 
It should also be noted that the facts of the instant case 
and the facts of In re Center Auto Parts, su12ra are substan-:.--
ially identical. There is no substantial difference between 
the phrase of the instant note, "This note is 5ecured by a 
certain ~ecurity Agreement of even date," and the phrase of 
the note in In re Center Auto Parts, "This note is secured 
by a certain financing statement." Both phrases clearly 
evidence the requisite intent. However, it should also be 
noted that the phrase of the instant note unequivocally states 
that the requisite security agreement exists between the parti~· ! 
whereas the phrase in the note of In re Center Auto Parts, ~ 
only implies that such an agreement exists. Thus, the requisite 
intent is more easily found in the instant case than in In re 
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Center Auto Parts, supra. 
POINT III. 
THE RULE OF LAW THAT MULTIPLE DOCUMENTS 
CAN SERVE AS A VALID SECURITY AGREEMENT 
IS IN HARMONY WITH THE UNDERLYING 
PURPOSES AND POLICIES OF THE UNIFORM 
COMMERCIAL CODE 
Under Article 9 of the UCC, the requirements of a valid 
security agreement have been greatly simplified. The pre-code 
ccrnplexities and technical forms and distinctions have been 
abolished. Comment to 9-101. The only specific requirements 
in the Code are those found in ~ ?OA-9-203(1) (b). The purpose 
of S 70A-9-203(l)(b) is to serve as a statute of frauds, 
preventing claims based wholly upon oral representation. 
The section also has an evidentiary purpose to prevent disputes 
as to which items of property are subject to the security 
interest. Comment 3 and 5 to 9-203; In re Numeric, supra. 
The Code does not specif:• that a piece of paper designated as 
"security agreement" be used in fulfilling these purposes, nor 
does it forbid the use of a financing statement or other types 
of documents or even a combination of documents. The Code is 
completely silent as to methods by which the purposes of 
s 70A-9-203 ( 1) (b) should be fulfilled. 
The Code, however, does provide some guidelines as to how 
J 
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its provisions should be construed. In s 70A-l-102(1), the 
Code states that "this act should be liberally construed and 
applied to promote its underlying purposes and policies." 
The underlying purposes and policies of the UCC are" ... to 
simplify, clarify and modernize the law governing commercial 
practices; (and) to make uniform the law among the various 
jurisdictions."§ 70A-9-102(2). 
In the instant case, a promissory note and a financing 
statement which are, without question, part of the same trans-
action, clearly fulfill the purposes of !i-70A-9-203 ( 1) (b). The 
two documents together constitute a complete and integrated 
written security agreement. Thus, the evidentiary and statute 
of frauds purposes of § 70A-9-203(1) (b) are fulfilled. 
CONCLUSION 
Any combination of documents can satisfy the requirements 
of a signed security agreement, pursuant to UCA s 70A-9-203. 
The documents together must show: (1) the signature of the 
debtor, (2) an adequate description of the collateral and 
(3) intent to create a security interest. The promissory note 
and financing statement together satisfy these three requirement;. 
Thus, a valid security agreement exists between the Plaintiff a~: 
the Defendants Blomquist and Peterson. 
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The foregoing is respectfully submitted. 
LORIN N. PACE 
RANDALL BUNNELL 
431 South Third East, B-1 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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